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Abstract—We show a simple method for constructing
an infinite family of graph formation games with link
bias so that the resulting games admits, as a pairwise
stable solution, a graph with an arbitrarily specified degree
distribution. Pairwise stability is used as the equilibrium
condition over the more commonly used Nash equilibrium
to prevent the occurrence of ill-behaved equilibrium strate-
gies that do not occur in ordinary play. We construct
this family of games by solving an integer programming
problem whose constraints enforce the terminal pairwise
stability property we desire.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Network Science community has largely dedi-
cated its efforts to the exposition and analysis of topolog-
ical properties that occur in several real-world networks
(e.g., scale-freeness [1]–[4]). Recently, there has been
interest in showing that these topological properties
may arise as a result of optimization, rather than some
immutable physical law [5]. As Doyle et al. [5] point
out, various networks such as communications networks
and the Internet are designed by engineers with some
objectives and constraints. While it is true that there
is often not a single designer in control of the entire
network, the network does not naturally evolve without
the influence of designers. In each application, the net-
work structure must be feasible with respect to some
physical constraints corresponding to the tolerances and
specifications of the equipment used in the network.
For example, in a system such as the world wide web,
a single web-page might have billions of connections,
however it is not possible for a node to have such a
degree in many other applications, such as collaboration
or road networks. Certainly the structure of the network
has a significant impact on its [the network’s] ability
to function, its evolution, and its robustness. However
network structures often arise as a result (locally) of
optimized decision made by a single agent or multiple
competitive or cooperative agents, who take network
structure and function into account as a part of a col-
lection of constraints and objectives.
Recently, network formation has been modeled from
a game theoretic perspective [6]–[9], and in [10], it was
shown that there exists games that result in the formation
of a stable graph with an arbitrary degree sequence
k = (k1, . . . , kn). These models require that the players
have similar objectives that are convex with minima near
the desired ki values. These assumptions were necessary
to show that a game can be constructed that admits a
stable graph with an arbitrary degree sequence. However,
this assumption is limiting in its modeling power because
players (usually) do not have an exact number of links
that they desire nor do they (usually) have an objective
function precisely specifying this desire. Instead the
ki arise endogenously as a result of other factors. In
this paper, we present a model incorporating a player’s
link bias - preference of one link over another. The
incorporation of link bias allows the game to result in
a stable graph of arbitrary degree without requiring the
degree sequence to be precisely coded into the game.
II. MODEL
Let N = {1, 2, . . . n} be a set of nodes. We will
assume n is fixed for the remainder of this paper. A
link between two nodes is any subset of size 2 of set
N . A graph g is any set of links and the complete graph
gc is the set of all size two subsets of N . The set G
is composed of all graphs over the node set N , that is,
G = {g : g ⊆ gc}.
In a network formation game, each node is a player.
Link bias is introduced by assuming player i has a cost
function fi : G→ R. For this paper, we assume a linear
cost function:
fi(g) =
∑
j
cijxij (1)
where
xij =
{
1 there is a link between i and j in g
0 else
(2)
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A player’s strategy is to determine to which nodes to link
in order minimize cost (or maximize payoff). Following
[7], a link between players i and j exists if and only
if the two players decide to link. That is, a player may
unilaterally reject a link. This is consistent with friending
policies on Facebook or linking policies on LinkedIn.
A. Stability
The value of a graph g is the total value produced
by agents in the graph; we denote the value of a
graph as the function v : G → R and the set of
of all such value functions as V . An allocation rule
Y : V × G → Rn distributes the value v(g) among
the agents in g. Denote the value allocated to agent i
as Yi(v, g). Since, the allocation rule must distribute the
value of the network to all players, it must be balanced;
i.e.,
∑
i Yi(v, g) = v(g) for all (v, g) ∈ V × G. The
allocation rule governs how the value is distributed and
thus makes a significant contribution to the model. In
the sequel we define Yi(v, g) = −fi(g) and define the
value function v implicitly to ensure that it is balanced.
Jackson and Wolinksy use pairwise stability to model
stable networks without the use of Nash equilibria [7].
Definition 1: A network g with value function v and
allocation rule Y is pairwise stable if (and only if):
1) for all ij ∈ g, Yi(v, g) ≥ Yi(v, g − ij) and
2) for all ij 6∈ g, if Yi(v, g + ij) > Yi(v, g), then
Yj(v, g + ij) < Yj(v, g)
Define Yi(v, g) = −fi(g). In this model, player i will
benefit from linking with any player j whenever cij < 0
and player i will be penalized for linking with any
player j whenever cij > 0. We may have an unspecified
behavior when cij = cji = 0. In this case it will neither
help nor hinder either player to establish a link. To
remove this possibility, we may assume link parsimony.
That is, we will assume that a link is established if and
only if both players benefit in some way. The stability
condition becomes:
Definition 2: A network g with Yi(v, g) = −fi(g) is
pairwise stable if (and only if):
1) for all ij ∈ g, cij < 0 and cji < 0
2) for all ij 6∈ g, if cij ≥ 0 then cji ≤ 0
We can construct a cost matrix C via an optimization
problem such that the resulting graph formation game
has as a (pairwise) stable solution a graph with an
arbitrary degree sequence k = (k1, . . . , kn).
Definition 3: Define ψ as a matrix of 0 − 1 values
indicating a player’s interest in a particular link. That is:
ψij =
{
1 if player i can benefit from link ij
0 if player i cannot benefit from link ij
Specifically, ψ is the boolean mapping of C:
ψij =
{
1 if cij < 0
0 if cij ≥ 0
Remark 4: To each graph g, we may associate a
vector of binary variables x = 〈xij〉 where xij is defined
in Equation 2. For simplicity we will write x for the
graph it represents when it is convenient.
Lemma 5: A graph x = 〈xij〉 is a symmetric stable
graph if and only if it meets the following constraints:
xij = xji ∀ ij
ψij + ψji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ ψij ∀ ij
xij ≤ ψji ∀ ij
xij , ψij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ ij
(3)
Proof: By definition, the first constraint ensures
the graph is symmetric. The second, third, and fourth
constraints ensure stability. If ψij = ψji = 1, then by
the definition of ψ, both cij < 0 and cji < 0 and the
second constraint forces xij = 1 as stability requires.
Alternatively, if either ψij = 0 or ψji = 0 or both, then
by the definition of ψ, cij ≥ 0 or cji ≥ 0 or both and
the third and fourth constraint force xij = 0 as stability
requires. Lastly, if xij = 0, then the second constraint
implies that either ψij = 0 (cij ≥ 0) and player i will
veto link ij or ψji = 0 (cji ≥ 0) and j will veto link ij,
as stability requires or ψij = ψji = 0 and both cij ≥ 0
and cji ≥ 0.
Now, suppose there is a symmetric stable graph x that
violates one of these constraints. If x violates the first
constraint, then it is not a symmetric graph. If the graph
x violates the second constraint, then there exists a link
ij such that ψij = 1, ψji = 1, but xij = 0. This implies
that cij < 0 and cji < 0 which implies that both player
i and j can benefit from link ij and this requires by
stability that xij = 1. However, this is a contradiction.
If x violates the third or fourth constraint, then there
exists a link ij such that xij = 1, but either ψij = 0
(cij ≥ 0) or ψji = 0 (cji ≥ 0), but this would violate
stability and hence be a contradiction. There cannot be a
symmetric pairwise stable graph x (and thus is a solution
to the graph formation game with link bias matrix C)
that violates one of these constraints.
If these constraints are consistent (i.e., the feasible
region is non-empty), then any feasible ψ for the con-
straints above can be used to generate a cost matrix C.
In fact, it can be used to generate an infinite number of
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cost matrices, the simplest one given by:
Cij =
{
−1 if ψij = 1
1 if ψij = 0
(4)
Lemma 6: Suppose C is a cost matrix and
f1, . . . , fN : G → R are player cost functions
with Yi(v,x) = −fi(x) = −
∑
j cijxij , which define a
graph formation game (for a graph x). Then the graph
x = 〈xij〉 is symmetric, pairwise stable (for the game)
and has degree sequence k = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) if and
only if it meets the following constraints:∑
j 6=i
xij = ki ∀ i
xij = xji ∀ ij
ψij + ψji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ ψij ∀ ij
xij ≤ ψji ∀ ij
ψij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ ij
(5)
Proof: The first constraint ensures that the graph has
degree sequence k = (k1, k2, . . . , kn). The remainder of
the proof follows from Lemma 5.
B. Construction of Cost Matrix via Optimization
In the event that there is no feasible ψ, we may solve
an optimization problem to find close solutions in the `1
metric on vector x by pricing out the first constraints in
Problem 5:
min
∑
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i
xij − ki
∣∣∣∣∣∣
s.t. xij − xji = 0 ∀i < j
ψij + ψji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ ψij ∀ ij
xij ≤ ψji ∀ ij
xij , ψij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j
(6)
We may reformulate this optimization problem as:
min
∑
i
ei
s.t.
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i
xij − ki
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ei
xij − xji = 0 ∀i < j
ψij + ψji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ ψij ∀ ij
xij ≤ ψji ∀ ij
xij , ψij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j
(7)
The non-linear constraints can be transformed into equiv-
alent linear constraints with the result being an integer
linear programming problem.
min
∑
i
ei
s.t.
∑
j 6=i
xij − ki ≤ ei
−
∑
j 6=i
xij + ki ≤ ei
ψij + ψji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ ψij ∀ ij
xij ≤ ψji ∀ ij
xij − xji = 0 ∀i < j
xij , ψij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j
(8)
Once a solution ψ is found to this optimization problem,
we can construct a cost matrix C using (e.g.,) Expression
4. Any matrix C constructed from such a solution ψ will
result in a graph as close as possible to degree sequence
k = (k1, . . . , kn) in the `1 metric. The nature of Problem
8 ensures the following theorem:
Theorem 7: For a given degree sequence k any cost
matrix C derived as a solution to Problem 8 and by
(e.g.,) Expression 4 will yield a graph formation game
that itself admits, as a pairwise stable solution, a graph
g whose degree sequence is as close as possible to k in
the `1 metric.
Proof: As shown in Lemma 5, any graph that
satisfies the third, fourth, and fifth constraints is stable.
Consider the simplified problem:
min e
s.t. x− k ≤ e
−x+ k ≤ e
(9)
It is easy to see that that the solution to Problem (9)
yields the closest x to k in the `1 metric. From here the
proof is straight forward.
Denote the solution to Problem (8) as x∗ and the ob-
jective function value at this solution as
∑
i e
∗
i . Suppose
there is a graph x that is both stable and has a degree
sequence closer to k = (k1, . . . , kn) than x∗ in the `1
metric. This implies that:∑
i
∑
j 6=i
|xij − ki| <
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
|x∗ij − ki| ≤
∑
i
e∗i
and x satisfies the other constraints for stability. This
implies that x∗ is not the optimal solution to (8), which
is a contradiction.
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III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Example 8: Suppose that we want the degree se-
quence of a stable graph that results from playing the
game described in Theorem 7 to have a power law degree
distribution with the degree of each player (ki) given in
the following table:
Node(s) ki
1-29 1
30-33 2
34 3
35 4
The distribution of values of ki forms an approximate
(with rounding to integers) power law distribution. This
is illustrated in Figure 1: We can now solve the opti-
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Fig. 1. The empirical desired distribution of the degrees of the players.
This degree distribution follows an approximate power law distribution.
mization Problem 8 to find the stable graph with degree
sequence as close (in Manhattan Norm) as possible to
degree sequence k. The resulting graphic solution is
shown in Figure 2. The degree distribution of the graphic
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Fig. 2. Collaboration Network for 35 nodes
solution is compared to the distribution of the ki values
in Figure 3.
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Targeted vs Actual Degree Distribution
Actual Degree
Targeted Degree
Fig. 3. Degree Distribution Comparison
i j i j i j i j
1 30 2 3 3 2 34 33
10 11 20 21 30 1 35 19
11 10 21 20 30 35 35 30
12 13 22 23 31 28 35 32
13 12 23 22 31 29 35 33
14 15 24 25 32 34 4 7
15 14 25 24 32 35 5 6
16 34 26 27 33 34 6 5
17 18 27 26 33 35 7 4
18 17 28 31 34 16 8 9
19 35 29 31 34 32 9 8
TABLE I
TABLE ILLUSTRATING ELEMENTS OF C THAT HAVE VALUE 1. ALL
OTHER ENTRIES ARE −1.
Now, we can construct C from ψ. If ψij = 1 (the pair
is listed in Table I), then cij = −1, otherwise cij = 1.
IV. LINKING PORTFOLIO WITH RESOURCE
CONSTRAINT
The model presented in [10] assumes a player has
a specific desired degree. Alternatively, the model pre-
sented in the previous section presumes instead that a
player links to players that can benefit them, but the
number of such links is unlimited. In reality players
link to other players who benefit them, but they are
also constrained by time and other resources that they
must consider, which prohibits them from befriending
everyone they could benefit from. Consider player i may
solve an optimization problem with form:
max fi(x)
s.t.
∑
j
aijxij ≤ bi
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j
(10)
Each set of possible links xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . xin) is
mapped to a ranking (which may have ties) by this
4
math program. Since a player now considers their entire
strategy when making a linking decision, we cannot
attribute the existence of a link or lack there of, to a
specific characteristic of only that link (cij or aij), rather
it is a result of the entire vector of parameters.
Nonetheless, given a degree sequence k, we may
construct a resource matrix A and link cost matrix C,
such that the resulting graph is stable and has degree
sequence k. It is rather straight forward to show this is
possible using to Theorem 7. We may consider fi(x) =
−∑j cijxij , A = 0, and large b, which essentially
makes the resource constraint void. This model is then
equivalent to the model in Theorem 7.
However, this model allows players to consider not
only their limited resources, but the fact that some links
require greater resources than others and some links
provide greater benefits than others and these benefits
and resource consumption may be asymmetric between
two players for a given link. Further, a general f will
allow a player to consider one player’s link with greater
weight than other or in fact a player may consider
nonlinear benefit functions. For example, a player may
benefit from one subset of players more than another or
there may be nonlinear effects between links with other
players. Nonetheless, for an arbitrary degree sequence k,
there is always a game that can be constructed with this
model that has a stable graph with that degree sequence.
A theoretical characterization of these possibilities is left
for future work.
V. CONCLUSION
With modest modeling characteristics, we may con-
struct a network formation game that admits as a pair-
wise stable solution a graph with an arbitrary degree
sequence. In fact, we may construct an entire family of
games admitting such graphs as pairwise stable solu-
tions. We can likely construct games with other graph
characteristics as well. Network Formation Games are
capable of modeling a wide variety of graph structures.
Further, there is opportunity to add richness to the model
with aspects such as the resource budget link portfolio
model.
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